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. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT Nearly eight decades have passed since early aviators like Billy Mitchell and Guilio Douhet first advocated strategic air power theory. Their original ideas still permeate all aspects of U.S. Air Force basic doctrine. The Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept is based on this notion of rapid deployment of strike forces anywhere in the world, and single-handedly sustaining operations in that region. The basic flaw of the AEF plan is to be based in the continental U.S. (CONUS). With no access in theatre, how will the Air Force achieve sustained air superiority? This paper will prove the AEF's present configuration cannot support all theatres due to limited access, insufficient mobility assets, and logistical support problems. This paper compares the capabilities and limitations of the AEF and Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) with regards to expeditionary features. We then apply the Navy and Air Force capabilities to real world scenarios to analyze the validity of current force structures. With the end of the Cold War, collapse of the Russian economy, and a renewed push for global democratization, many question the need for a robust military. The effectiveness of both, the AEF and CVBG will be discussed. Lastly, we give recommendations for revisions to the AEF, enabling its effective participation in future joint operations. 15 
Guilio Douhet, 1921
Nearly eight decades have passed since General Douhet, the father of bomber aviation, first advocated this strategic air power theory. His original ideas still permeate all aspects of U.S. Air Force basic doctrine. Even the "Air Expeditionary Force" (AEF)
concept is based on this notion of rapid deployment of strike forces anywhere in the world, and single-handedly sustaining operations in that region. While no one would dispute the fact that the United States has the premier Air Force in the world, the basic flaw of the AEF plan is that it is CONUS-based. With no access in theatre, how will the Air Force achieve sustained air superiority? This paper will prove the AEF's present configuration does not support all theatres due to limited access, insufficient mobility assets, logistic support problems, and deployment costs.
The U.S. Navy Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) provides a unique instrument with which to compare capabilities to the AEF. The desire is not to pick one service over the other, but rather show the need for restructuring the AEF to make the Air Force a more viable and offensive joint service. First, we review the hierarchy of strategic concepts for employing the AEF and CVBG by examining the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS). Second, we define the AEF and CVBG concepts, outlining unique warfighting capabilities and limitations each bring to the theatre. Third, we look at real world deployments of early AEFs to document lessons learned useful for proposed future applications of the AEF. Lastly, recommendations are given for changes in force structure for the USAF to meet future NSS and NMS objectives while maintaining morale and retention.
With the end of the Cold War, collapse of the Russian Communist ideology, and a renewed push for global democratization, many lawmakers and taxpayers question the future need for a robust and offensive military. After all, the United States is unarguably the last remaining superpower. However, even though our military might is unparalleled, it is not unchallenged. The dangers we face now and in the future are very complex and unorthodox. As stated in the NSS, "Ethnic conflict and outlaw states threaten regional stability; terrorism, drugs, organized crime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are global concerns that transcend national borders." 1 Although the U.S. is doing great economically, the U.S. economic strategy of enlargement does not allow a passive position in international conflict. As it has been said, "To whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required." 2 Our government realizes the only way to really achieve a "New World order" is by sharing our prosperity and democratic ideals with the rest of the world. This is clearly stated as the NSS's three core objectives:
3 -Enhance security with effective diplomacy and military forces.
-Bolster U.S. economic prosperity.
-Promote Democracy abroad.
The priorities President Clinton has presented to achieve these core objectives all include the underlying theme of constructing international ties through democratic, political and economic means. However, the President's final guidance states: "We must have the diplomatic and military tools to meet all these challenges. We must maintain a strong and ready military. We will achieve this by selectively increasing funding for weapons modernization and taking care of our men and women in uniform." 4 This becomes the root of our military's financial struggle. Each service continues to lobby to show the importance of desired weapons systems that are fiscally out of reach. We live in a world of "selectively increased funding." The Reagan military buildup of the 1980s is gone, and will not return for any conflict short of global war. The current military mindset is do more with less, and be ready to deploy at a moment's notice to any "hotspot" in the world with a lean and lethal force. This is the driving force behind the USAF's plan to change the way they do business, and to become "expeditionary" in nature. However, this is not a new concept. In July 1955, the Air Force unveiled the Composite Air Strike Forces (CASF) concept. 5 It was designed to be an integrated, self-supporting organization that could deploy to a crisis area and operate until normal operational forces deploy into the area. 6 The CASF included all elements of a modern air force: fighters, ground attack aircraft, reconnaissance, bombers, and transports. The concept came as a result of the foreign policy shift during the Eisenhower administration from massive retaliation to flexible response. 7 However, due to the Vietnam War and internal resistance within the Air Force, the CASF concept was formally inactivated in July 1973. and Prepare now." 10 We must Shape the international environment and create conditions favorable to U.S. interests and global security. Our Armed Forces must Respond to the full spectrum of crises in order to protect our national interest. We must also take steps to Prepare now for an uncertain future." 11 The AEF concept was designed specifically to meet these challenges in support of the NMS. Does it fit the bill? Expeditionary Aerospace Force, is an entire force culture change to help work the operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) problem for the Air Force. 13 The entire aerospace "force" will eventually be broken down into ten AEFs (deploying forces). 14 In many mission areas this will significantly improve the stability and predictability of deployments so people can manage both their professional and personal lives. 15 If successful, the AEF concept would go a long way toward improving morale and retention within the Air Force.
AEF CONCEPT
The problem for the USAF in meeting their "tenets of air and space power" 16 with the current force structure is that the organization is not geared to be expeditionary. It requires fully functional forward bases (including permanently deployed support personnel) from which to operate. This is a major fiscal dilemma. As mentioned earlier, 20 As mentioned, the current plan is to have ten of these separate AEF packages.
Two of these would be on call to respond at any given time, and will remain on call for a 90-day period. 21 This deployment rotation would be set up according to a predetermined schedule, so each AEF package will only have one 90-day alert every 15-18 months, similar to the rotational deployments of the Navy's CVBG. 22 The current goal of the AEF alert packages is to be able to conduct combat sorties in theater, 48 hours after an execute order is issued and then sustain combat airpower for three to five days without resupply. 23 This timeline is a great capability considering an aircraft carrier would have to tether within 1500 nautical miles to reach a theater within two days. 24 presence strategy doesn't work, the AEF could actually deploy to the "hotspot" and be combat ready within 48 hours. As an additive force, Looney offered that an AEF could be deployed to increase the airpower available to any regional JFC in times of heightened tensions, such as Bosnia or Operation Northern Watch. 31 Finally, as a force-filler, they could respond if a CVBG gap is projected for a certain Area of Responsibility (AOR).
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These gaps will now be a certainty. Based on Navy limitations, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has signed up for only 270 days of Arabian Gulf coverage. If there are simultaneous crisis in the Mediterranean or in Southeast Asia (cf. -Straits of Taiwan incident of 1996), the carriers will be pulled out of the Arabian Gulf AOR and redeployed to the crisis areas. The AEFs could then be deployed to the Arabian Gulf to fill the gap until the carrier returned.
As mentioned, from a public relations standpoint, the successful application of the AEF concept addresses the ability to tackle the deployment and retention problems at the same time. With a known rotation schedule of 15-18 months, personnel can better plan for possible 90-day separations, and significantly reduce the total number of days deployed overseas. Keep in mind, the plan is to keep the AEFs CONUS-based, on call, but not actually deployed until time of crisis. "Certainly, being tied to a beeper at Langley AFB is a better option than being deployed to Southwest Asia [SWA] on 90-120 day stints."
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AEF LIMITATIONS
We enter the 21st century where our enemies are not known. With "pop-up"
contingencies becoming a way of life, the flexibility that an AEF provides is in high demand. However, the cultural change within the service will not happen overnight.
Leadership is going forth with the plan, knowing there are limitations and challenges.
Major General Smith is confident of the ability to get there in 48 hours -it has been done several times now. 34 However, some of the current problems expose the need for further analysis: overseas bases and host nation support, foreign nation overflight requirements, logistics and transport aircraft availability, Army versus USAF deployment requirements, and support aircraft availability. The USAF will have to deal with all of the above challenges every time they plan on deploying to a crisis or in their "force-filler" mission.
Overseas Bases and Host Nation Support
Overseas bases and host nation support is the first challenge for the AEF. If our diplomats and regional CINC can't persuade a country to host our forces, then there are three options; 1) deploy to one of our remaining 17 overseas bases and hope it is close enough to the fight, 2) fly bomber missions only, from CONUS bases, and hope this deters the enemy, 3) send in a special forces team to take over an airport in enemy territory (requiring no prior permission); send in the army to hold it, then finally deploy an AEF for combat operations. Although this last option sounds a little facetious, the USAF and Army have affiliated two composite wings with airborne and ranger forces which are specifically trained for forced entry and airfield takedown missions. 35 This option is very risky, and the cost in dollars and lives could be exorbitant.
International Overflight Requirements
Assuming our diplomats are successful in acquiring host nation support for a deploying AEF, the next problem will be foreign nation overflight permission. To fly from CONUS to any AOR (except for possibly the Caribbean) will require U.S. aircraft to cross somebody's coastline on their way to the fight. If one or more nations deny these overflight requests, then deployment missions become much more circuitous and lengthy (or impossible). This can require additional tanker assets if a semi-direct flight to the AOR is desired. If the additional tankers aren't available, then additional host country support must be granted for intermediary stops for fuel. This further complicates the process. Pilot fatigue will also be a concern, as normal fighter missions are only one to three hours long. However, it can be done, as proven by the deployment from Langley AFB, Virginia direct to Jordan non-stop for AEF II in June 1996. The flight took over thirteen hours. 36 Needless to say, these F-15 pilots were not combat ready upon their arrival.
Operation El Dorado Canyon conducted against Libya and Muammar Qaddafi in
April 1986 is an example of the potential difficulties that lie ahead for the USAF. The fear of terrorist reprisals and loss of business caused France, Germany, Italy, and Spain to refuse to cooperate in a military strike against Libya. 37 Using USAF F-111s from RAF Lakenheath, England, the mission required a round-trip flight of 6,400 miles that lasted thirteen hours, requiring eight to twelve in-flight refuelings for each aircraft.
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Logistics and Transport Aircraft Availability
Logistics and transport aircraft availability are currently the biggest question marks plaguing the AEF concept. Although the AEFs will be separated into ten separate packages of 30 fighter/strike aircraft, there is no dedicated transport aircraft attached to packages. Thus, even if the first two problems of host nation support and overflight rights are granted, our two AEF packages might arrive well ahead of their support personnel, fuel, weapons and essential maintenance supplies.
Of course, the logistics chain does not end once they arrive in theater. A continuous air bridge will have to be established to support these crews and aircraft in their primitive forward bases. Prepositioning supplies for anticipated contingencies around the world could partially solve the initial logistics crisis, but only if the right locations are chosen.
General Smith identifies this as the number one problem facing the AEF that deploy outside of already established bases. "If you don't go to the Gulf or Jordan, logistics will be the difficult task." 39 If the logistics planners select the wrong sights for these forwarddeployed stockpiles, then they further complicate the transport aircraft predicament.
Additional flights will be needed to move these stockpiles to the correct AEF airbases.
The following is BGEN Looney's attempt to counter this limitation:
"At first glance, one might think this [strategic and tanker asset availability] would create a severe constraint. However, the deployment of an AEF would most likely occur during periods with normal day-to-day airlift requirements, not, for example during a severe crisis, a major regional conflict about to erupt, or early in an isolated crisis situation." 40 This is contradicting to the entire AEF concept. After all, it is based on the notion of being able to rapidly deploy to any crisis situation, anywhere on the globe within 48 hours.
The "bare base" logistics issue is a known problem, but solutions are forthcoming. 
Joint Airlift Requirements
To further exacerbate the strategic airlift dilemma, the Army is anxious to know which service gets first priority for transport into a crisis situation. All the discussion heretofore has been about getting the AEF to the theater. Since the Army also had its overseas bases slashed, they also brought the bulk of their forces home. 
Support Aircraft Availability
The two AEFs that deploy to any given theater are certainly not going in without additional support aircraft to back them up, which necessitates further airlift and tanker flights. For example, the USAF fighter or strike aircraft typically do not fly without an AWACS (Airborne Weapons and Control System) airborne to direct them. AWACS, bombers and other high value-low density (HVLD) aircraft do not neatly fit into the ten proposed AEFs. There are simply not enough to support the envisioned AEF schedule.
Moreover, since the retirement of the EF-111, the sole electronic tactical jammer remaining in the inventory is the Navy's EA-6B Prowler.
The EA-6B joint venture between the Air Force and Navy is the result of a decision between the two services and the secretary of defense to consolidate the mission of airborne threat radar jamming. 
CVBG AND NAVAL AVIATION: A BETTER WAY?
From the first post-Cold War strategic white paper, From the Sea, (1992) to today's program guide for the U.S. Navy, Vision...Presence...Power, (1998), the Navy's direction is clearly stated. Admiral Jay Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), states, "These strategic and operational concepts serve two fundamental purposes: to sustain our Navy's operational primacy and ensure our ability to influence events ashore, directly and decisively, from the sea." 50 The Navy-Marine Corps team is certainly unique in its ability to position self-sustaining airpower and combat troops twelve miles off any coast and remain there for sustained operations. The other fundamental difference for the Navy-Marine Corps team is its capability to quickly shift missions from either a humanitarian effort, to a deterrent role, or to go on the offensive as an overwhelming attacking force "from the sea." 51 The following is an examination of CVBG capabilities, limitations, and airwing composition.
CVBG Capabilities
Forward presence is the key. "On any given day, approximately one-third of our naval forces are deployed overseas, with another twenty percent or so underway from home ports. Naval expeditionary forces are "on-scene," operating day in and day out, in each of the major deployment regions -the Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Gulf, Indian
Ocean, Western Pacific, and Caribbean." 52 As more and more overseas bases close, our ability to react to any given crisis with the Army or Air Force greatly decreases. The goal for all military forces is to support the President's NSS core objectives as stated earlier.
By maintaining a forward presence with CVBGs, the U.S. government is much closer to attaining those NSS core objectives. There is no greater diplomatic tool for deterrence than a 90,000-ton carrier sitting twelve miles off the coast. The number of distinguished visitors (DV) hosted by deployed carriers during recent deployments show this philosophy at work.
No host nation agreement or overflight permissions are required for the Navy, which certainly gives our leaders greater flexibility to react quickly to any global crisis.
Remember, our National Military Strategy is based on three concepts -Shape, Respond, and Prepare. The flexible nature of the CVBG is shown by its ability to rapidly relocate itself to any global hotspot, and remain there indefinitely, while sustaining itself at sea. A CVBG does not have to enter port to re-fuel, re-arm, or re-supply itself, as this is all done while underway at sea by supply ships. No air bridge or strategic airlift assets are required to maintain the Navy's combat capability. This flexibility and self sufficiency helps our country positively shape the world through peaceful diplomacy. Instead of "retrenching" forces back to the U.S., the Navy remains forward deployed, preparing itself for any future conflict. The Air Force must mirror this capability to successfully meet the challenges of the 21st century.
If you look at any speech given by Admiral Johnson, you quickly discover the Navy is not immune from challenges, but an examination of what a CVBG gives the JFC, reinforces the need for "more of the same" flexibility and forward presence. The following paragraphs provide a snapshot of some of the advantages (and challenges) the CVBG possesses, making it a benchmark for AEF designers.
Carrier Airwing Composition
Each airwing embarked onboard a carrier is comprised of the following squadrons:
three F/A-18 fighter/attack squadrons (twelve aircraft in each), and one F-14 fighter squadron (fourteen aircraft); there is one EA-6B electronic jamming squadron (four aircraft); one E-2C airborne early warning squadron (four aircraft, similar to an AWACS); one S-3B antisubmarine/tanker squadron (six to eight aircraft); one C-2 cargo/transport squadron (two aircraft); and one SH-60 helicopter squadron (six to eight aircraft). 53 Except for supplemental tankers required for long-range strikes, the carrier alone brings a very lethal self contained Naval Air Force to the fight. The JFCs want more of this capability. The AEF is the Air Force "ante" to stay in the game.
Numbers and Limitations
The U.S. Navy currently has twelve aircraft carriers and ten airwings, and will maintain this force structure through at least the year 2020. 54 Only three carriers are nonnuclear, with the last conventional carrier scheduled to retire by 2018. 55 Nuclear power enables our carriers to move rapidly through the seas, without the need to be refueled every five to seven days, greatly increasing their flexibility and endurance. However, even the nuclear carriers are dependent on replenishment at sea for jet fuel, weapons, and food. Considering combat operations, the most important issue is the jet fuel. For normal flight operations, a nuclear carrier uses approximately seven percent of its jet fuel everyday. This necessitates the need for supply ships at a minimum of every two weeks.
If the OPTEMPO increases, the need for replenishment increases. In this respect, sustained operations are a challenge to any service.
Another challenge facing the Navy and Air Force is the price of these sustained operations. As our force shrinks and our OPTEMPO increases, this endurance is taking a toll on people. "Real world operational experiences during the 1990s and numerous studies have confirmed a force of fifteen carriers is needed to satisfy the requirements for a full-time carrier presence in critical world regions. A force of twelve carriers enable presence and war-fighting needs to met at an acceptable level of risk." 56 This risk comes because there are gaps in carrier presence if the Navy stays within the 180-day deployment schedule cycle. Each CVBG is on an 18-month rotation for these six-month cruises. All services are being forced to provide packages of capability that are actually becoming more and more alike.
Sortie Rates
Operationally, the Carrier's airwing is roughly equal to two deployed AEFs, as it can easily support 100 strike and 20 support sorties per day. 57 However, in response to a crisis situation the carrier can "surge" its abilities and double these numbers. During a recent exercise, the Nimitz battle group and its airwing, CVW-9, participated in six days of intense scenario driven operations, which generated about 700 sorties. 58 Shield.
There are two major limitations to the Navy's capability. The first is Admiral
Johnson's Arabian Gulf limitation of 270 days, based on a twelve-carrier force.
Something will have to fill the gap, and the Air Force has proven it can do this in SWA.
Secondly, no one would believe the Navy could be a stand-alone service, regardless of capability. Operation Desert Storm is a perfect example illustrating the need for the Air Shield. Because a six-month buildup is a luxury not guaranteed in every conflict, "expeditionary" has become the marquee for all services. The next chapter explores the evolutionary process the USAF has been using to become "expeditionary." The research centers on the USAF successful deployments to the post Desert Storm SWA, and summarizes the major lessons learned.
Notes
AEF Operations
To date, the USAF has completed seven AEF test deployments. 1 Until the ten proposed AEFs are ready to go, lessons learned and battle lab simulations are used to provide relevant information on AEF capabilities and limitations.
The first AEF deployed to Bahrain as a test case using a reduced force of 18 aircraft and 600 people. It was a minimal deployment effort with little real world application, whose sole purpose was to build the requirements database for future deployments. 
LESSONS LEARNED
Putting bombs on target within 48 hours of being tasked takes a Herculean effort for even the best-equipped and most potent Air Force in the world. Advances in technology have greatly improved numerous areas, helping us to move men and equipment faster, hit targets more accurately and make living conditions more tolerable for those in the field.
In fact, these are recognized strong points where the USAF has the edge over the Navy. The number is based on carriage of two weapons on wing pylons (two on each conformal fuel tanks (CFTs)) and one on the centerline of the fuselage. 5 In sharp contrast, the current carrier-based F/A-18C/D Hornets can only carry two PGMs. Assuming the argument of "one bomb -one target" is accurate, the USAF is far superior when measuring lethality per aircraft.
The new F/A-18E/F Super Hornet numbers are more encouraging, providing the ability to carry up to four of the currently used PGMs due to the addition of two more weapons stations. 6 In designing the Super Hornet, the Navy blends low observable technology with state-of-the-art defensive electronic countermeasures, reduced areas of vulnerability, and high precision technology air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons.
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Technology has clearly leveled the playing field in the AEF versus carrier comparison, and will continue to drive both services toward more research and development of modern "smart" munitions. an AEF is called upon to deploy, all of the necessary AMC assets will have to be rerouted from whatever mission they were assigned and proceed to the assigned bases. Additionally, C-130s will be needed to pick up the required personnel and aircrews to be brought to a centralized airlift location. Lastly, General Smith also emphasized the unanticipated extra C-5s necessary to airlift advanced security and Office of Special Investigations (OSI) personnel to the theater.
B) The current strategic airlift fleet is already task saturated due to a 61% mission capable rate for the C-5As and 71% for C-5Bs. 10 Further complications come from a slower than anticipated procurement rate for the C-17's and an intensified retirement plan for the C-141's. 11 The C-17 production rate will never cover the retirement rate for the C-141. The loss is estimated to be approximately 1,000
pallets each day in capability. 12 Proponents argue that a "one for one" match will not be required, because the C-17 can carry 2.5 times the cargo that a C-141 can carry. However, using this same logic, one missed C-17 sortie loses 2.5 times the cargo. Assuming a 100% sortie rate, the 120 C-17s budgeted will still not come close to replacing the capability of 266 C-141s. Commercial carriers will probably fill this shortage of aircraft; however, they are limited by their inability to carry oversized or hazardous cargo such as aircraft engines. plan is available, it will be the same ad hoc arrangement that keeps the schedulers (and the scheduled) in a state of uncertainty.
F) The additional deployment costs for airlift assets is seven to ten million dollars above similar training requirements at home, 16 and these costs are not currently included in the USAF annual budget.
G) The USAF has no Depot level maintenance facilities in SWA, and has to rely on "Time-Definite Resupply" and "CONUS Reach Back" for mission critical parts and routine maintenance requirements. 17 The reach back concept will require additional inter and intra-theater airlift assets, unless requirements can be contracted to companies such as DHL and FedEx (currently used in SWA). 18 This concept works well for small parts, but as General Smith explained, you can't order an F-15 engine and expect DHL to get it to you the next day.
Oversized cargo will certainly require separate USAF airlift missions to meet the AEF needs.
Guard and Reserve Participation
Adding the Guard and Reserve to the ten AEF schedule is a necessity, but remains a Two week deployments (worst case) will severely limit the AEF in-theater readiness and mission effectiveness.
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Heavy Bomber Sortie Rate
As mentioned earlier, the amount of bombs and fuel required to support continuous B-52, B-1, or B-2 sorties would severely impact the logistics train if the bombers were to deploy in theater with the fighters. 20 As a result, the current plan is to allocate two B-1 bombers to each AEF, but to keep the rest CONUS-based. 21 This limitation requires the CONUS-based bomber crews to fly nearly 36-hour (roundtrip) missions. 22 Accordingly, bombers account for only one strike sortie per aircraft, per day in contingency planning. 23 The quandary for AEF planners is to shorten these incredibly long missions. One suggestion is to forward deploy the bombers. While it is understood that every service is fighting for survival in the midst of fiscal restraints, the AEF is not intended as a replacement for the carrier. They both have their respective part to play in National Military Strategy. Given that, let us look strictly at the AEF, and offer tangible changes that will enable the AEF (and EAF) to succeed.
The Future of Munitions
As MGEN Smith stated, this is all about servicing targets. The latest technological advances in munitions have been revolutionary. Small, precision-guided weapons is exactly what both the USAF and the Navy need to enable a smaller "footprint" in other nations. These miniature munitions are currently being developed in conjunction with the future joint strike/fighter aircraft design requirements. All "smart" bombs will be small (250 pounds or less) standoff weapons that are inertial or GPS-guided, wind corrected, with smart warheads able to penetrate hard and deep buried targets. 5 This will reduce the number of bombs needed to service each target, and ensure a higher probability/kill ratio on the first pass.
"Smart" munitions make warfighting more precise, shrinks the numbers of aircraft and aircrew required, and simplifies logistics. If the EAF philosophy is to work, this nation will continue to be dependent on revolutions in technology. This is on the shelf right now. Senior leaders need to get behind these programs and understand how they will affect U.S. military success in the next century.
Rigid Deployment Schedule
There seems to be a battle among senior leadership over the marketing for this new force structure. As pointed out earlier, many have pitched this as a way to improve morale and retention among all service members, because it will be in part, more predictable. 6 Others say it is a warfighting concept to make a "leaner" yet still lethal Air
Force. Both have to be correct. However, the CONUS-based concept is not going to get the job done.
We propose a rigid forward-deployed schedule of two AEFs at all times. Not just during contingencies, but at all times. Few really believe the AEF will be a deterrent force when it is not visible. Not even the combatant commanders (CINC) in theater. In fact, no CINC has been satisfied with the notion of "call us if you need us." Since its inception, AEFs apportioned to Central Command have been deployed. Not because there was a crisis, but because they were simply apportioned. Why not just get in the routine? The Navy has been doing it for fifty years. This is not to say schedules are not flexible. In fact, a CVBG deployment may get moved up to assist in a crisis operation, but it will never be the norm.
Numbers and Lengths of AEFs
Has the leadership looked at a smaller number of AEFs? The proposed EAF looks more like a mirror image of the carrier airwing structure found in the Navy. This is not to say it is a simple replication of the Navy's philosophy, but it may be the right direction.
Now juxtapose an EAF with eight instead of ten, and 120-day deployments instead of 90-day deployments. If the USAF desires to seriously consider saving money, it must stop moving people and equipment back and forth with such frequency.
HVLD Aircraft
By cutting the number of AEFs from ten to eight, the USAF can better utilize their HVLDs and avoid the burnout syndrome affecting their over-deployed and over-utilized silver bullets. The Navy experienced this very same problem with our helicopter detachments deploying in "ones" and "twos" aboard small surface ships, such as cruisers, destroyers and frigates. The Navy solution was making one huge squadron on each coast, and creating rigid deployment schedules with specific crews, including maintenance personnel and equipment. This solved numerous logistics and personnel manning issues, and gave leadership positions to more junior officers as they were tasked to be the officers-in-charge (OIC) of these two aircraft deployments for the entire six months.
Logistics
Routine deployments for the Air Force will make airmen and logisticians more familiar with the requirements for standard routes and enable budgeters to budget AEF deployments from year to year. Materials, parts, and services required all become a known entity. Regularly scheduled shipments can now come in fast Sealift ships saving millions of dollars each year, reducing the strain on the AMC community. Intermediate maintenance facilities can be built to eliminate the wasted airlift assets required to haul hazardous or large items back to the states. Some say this goes against the expeditionary mindset because it makes a larger footprint in the theater. However, regional facilities at established bases will go a long way in cost savings. While there is a tradeoff between size of footprint and airlift costs, permanent housing and munitions depots can also make things easier.
Use of Familiar AORs
The AEF cannot rapidly deploy anywhere in the world. Unless the AEF is going to a fully supported base in an AOR, they will require an inordinate amount of preparatory than what sounds politically acceptable. The Cold War "Checkered Flag" concept was devised to rapidly deploy sufficient assets to a familiar AOR in order to defeat a known threat. Revisit this plan, make the necessary logistical adjustments, and apply it to SWA, Kosovo and Korea. Use the USAF where it can be most effective, and let the Navy handle contingency operations where host nation support or permission is not required.
Restricting the Carrier and AEF AORs
By giving USAF AEFs strict forward-deployed AORs, the carriers could be similarly 
CONCLUSION
The AEF concept is a good one, and in the words of Admiral Johnson, "It is a very courageous decision." Changing the entire structure of the USAF culture is no small feat.
To meet the challenges of the 21st century by being "expeditionary," the mindset of every airman must be changed.
Fully stocked and supported overseas bases are a thing of the past. The only way to meet the national strategy with ever shrinking budgets is to build smaller, less expensive, yet more lethal weapons packages that can swiftly react to an ever-changing world. The Navy has seen its share of "culture change" during its 223-year history, and can share the USAF's pain. Sail to steam, battleship to carrier fleet dominance, propeller to jet aircraft, and now, all male to mix gender shipboard crews are just a few examples. The other service chiefs have a proven history in expeditionary warfare, and will be critical in providing insight to help solve the Air Force re-configuration issues.
The most recent AEF deployments have proven it is a viable concept, but only if it deploys to a previously established base. The lessons learned from these deployments show that without host nation support, forward-deployed supplies, and a very intensive airlift armada to keep the supplies flowing, the AEF cannot achieve its 48-hour requirement. The aircraft carrier is a great platform that avoids most of the problems associated with land based forces, but is limited in numbers and speed. It cannot be the sole crisis response force available to the National Command Authority. The AEF is needed.
In review of the recommendations presented, the first step will be to actually deploy the AEFs on a routine basis. This will alleviate the air bridge and transport aircraft dilemma, as the personnel and material could routinely be supplied via fast sealift ships or commercial aircraft. These routine deployments would also help morale and retention, as personnel would now be able to better plan their lives. Second, decreasing the number of AEFs to eight and extending the deployments would save dollars by moving people and aircraft less between theaters. Third, leadership should include the HVLD aircraft in the AEF packages, and push hard for the future budgets that integrate them into the necessary forces.
